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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(i)

Nature of the case.

Appellant entered into an agreement with respondent to settle a defamation suit brought
against appellant by respondent. Appellant agreed to keep respondent's medical records and
documents confidential and not to disparage or defame respondent in consideration for monetary
compensation paid by respondent. After appellant received the agreed upon compensation, she
promptly published a despicable book accusing respondent of cultism, deceit, false teaching,
fraud, lies, misrepresentation, prostitution, stealing, and using cocaine and heroin.
(ii)

Course of proceeding.

On March 3,2011, Vianna Stibal and ThetaHealing Institute ofK.nowledge Inc.
(Respondent) brought suit for breach of contract against April Fano and Right Way Publishing,
LLC (Appellant) in the Seventh District Court in Bonneville County for damages in excess of
seventy-two thousand five hundred dollars ($72, 500). (R. Vol I, pp. 1-5). Respondent's claim
7

for breach of contract was based upon her release agreement with appellant settling all the claims
of appellant and respondent in a prior defamation case filed by respondent against appellant in
Bonneville County Case No. CV-2009-1852 (R. Vol. I, pp. 2-3).
AppeIIant filed an answer on April 5, 2011, alleging, inter-alia, that: (1) any statements
made by appellant were expressions of her opinion, (2) appellant was not the author of any
statements in the book "Shady Healing," (3) April Fano was not responsible for the actions of
Right Way Publishing. (R. Vol I, pp. 9-10).
Respondent filed a motion to amend her complaint on January 30,2012 to add claims for
breach of covenant of good faith, fraud in the in inducement contract, fi-aud upon the court,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages (R. Vol 1. pp. 12-20).
Respondent filed a motion for ruling on her amended complaint April 23, 2012, (R. Vol
II pp. 1-6; R. Vol 1. pp. 12-20,22-25; ROA report! case docket p.3, 4/23/2012). Appellant filed

an objection to respondent's motion to amend on May 3,2013.
The trial court ruled on respondent's motion(s) to amend on May 21, 2013, stating that:
Although the defendant's agree that the action of April Fano upon which
plaintiffs based this motion occurred before July 30,2010, the book at issue
was set to be published after July 30, 2010. As such, this court finds that,
"Plaintiffs have met their proof to amend the complaint to include punitive
damage. Where this case is not being tried to a jury, the court will
determine the full application of the amendment at trial."
(R. Vol L p. 31, par 3).
Appellant filed an amended complaint on May 24,2012, withdrawing claims of
claim of unjust enrichment, defamation, and libel. CR. Vol. L, pp 34-38)
Appellant and respondent stipulated that (1) appellant's claim for unjust enrichment,
defamation, and libel were withdrawn, and (2) the remaining issues to be tried before the
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court were breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive
damages. (R. Vol. I. p. 39)
A court trial was held on June 11 th and

It\ 2012 before the Honorable Jon. J.

Shindurling. He rendered his opinion on September 2,2012, ruling that: (1) Respondent
breached her contract with appcllant; (2) Respondent proved actual damages of six thousand
two hundred fifty dollars ($6250); (3) Appellant's claim of unclean hands did not apply, (4)
Respondent's claim for severe emotional distress was not sufficient, (5) Appellant's conduct
was intentional, extreme and outrageous; (6) Appellant's conduct was an "extreme deviation
from reasonable standards of conduct and was performed with a disregard for its likely
consequences," and (7) Punitive damages in the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)
were appropriate in this case. (R Vol. 1., pp 41-54; p. 54, par. 1, 7-8)
Judgment was entered in favor of respondent on September 20,2012, awarding six
thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($6250) for actual damage and fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) for punitive damages plus interest. (R. Vol. 1. p. 56).
Respondent filed a memorandum and affidavit for an award of fees of twenty seven
thousand six hundred dollars ($27,600) and costs of one thousand six hundred one doIIars
and seventy cents ($1601.70) on October 13,2012 based on the release agreement provision
for attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party under paragraph 11 of the agreement. (R.
VoL II, pp. 15-29; Exhibit 1; Appendix 1).
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on the 1i

h

day of October, 2012. (R. Vol, 1. p. 58).

An amended notice of appeal was filed October 25, 2012. (R. Vol 1. p. 67)
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The clerk's certificate of appeal and exhibits were filed October 25,2012. The
clerk's celiificate of the record, exhibits, and transcripts were logged with the Supreme Court
and entered February 1, 2013. (R. Vol I. pp.71-77).
Appellant filed an affidavit, motion, and memorandum for fees and costs with an
objection to respondent's fees and costs on October 12,2012. (R. Vol II., pp. 31-47).
Judge Shindurling issued an opinion and order on the parties' motion(s) for attorney
fees on November 29,2012, granting respondent's motion for fees of twenty-seven thousand
six hundred seventy dollars ($27, 670.00) and costs of five hundred sixteen dollars and
seventeen cents ($516.70) and denying appellant's motion for fees and costs. (R. Vol 1., p.
62-66).
Final judgment was entered February 12,2013, awarding respondent six thousand
two hundred fifty dollars ($6250) for breach of contract, fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for
punitive damages, twenty seven thousand six hundred seventy dollars ($27,670) for fees and
five hundred sixteen dollars and seventy cents ($516.70) in costs, and total judgment of
eighty-four thousand four hundred and thirty-six dollars ($84,436.70) plus interest at the
legal rate of 5.25% (R. Vol. II pp. 48-49).
This comi entered an order March 13,2013, declaring that appellant's objection and
motion to augment record to the record on March 5, 2013 was moot as an order to augment
the record was entered March 5, 2013; and the document requested in the augmentation was
previously filed with the court.
Further, the appellant was ordered to file its brief on or before thirty-five (35) day of
the order dated March 13,2013 [or April 14, 2013].
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Appellant did not file its brief until August 13, 2013 or one hundred fifty days (150)
days after the court's above order.
(iii)

Statement of facts.

Appellant and respondent entered into an agreement to settle a pending lawsuit between the
parties, arising from respondent's claims of defamation libel and slander and appellant's counter-claim.
Their agreement provides in pertinent pali:
8.

April [Appellant] and Vianna [Respondent] "agree to keep confidential the
terms of this Agreement, as well as all matters, documents and medical
records pertaining to the Lawsuit ...

9.

Appellant and Respondent agree not to make any disparaging,
defaming, or otherwise negative comment regarding each other to any
th ird party ... "

(R. Vol pp. 43, 44; PIn's Exhibit 1, See Appendix 1)
Respondent testified that Appellant did not abide by her promises made in their
agreement as appellant and Lindsey Stock published a "horrible" book, Shady Healing,
which disclosed respondent's medical records and accused respondent of deceit, lies,
false teaching, stealing, misrepresentation, fraud, disrespect for the law, hard drug use,
cocaine, heroin and acid, as well as cultism and prostitution. (Tr. p.39, L9-11, 15-16, 18;
pAO,L.1-7,16-22).
Respondent testified that Shady Healing is "devastating... [April] says unbelievable
lies ... they call me a cult. I'm like Mansons ... the hatred that flows out ofthis ... [is] pure
hatred .. .it's painful." Respondent exclaimed that her blood pressure rose and her heart broke.
(Tr. pA2, L.3-6, pA3, L.11-12, 17,19; pA4 L.1-5). Respondent's husband, Guy Stibal,
testified that when Shady Healing became known to Vianna, it caused Vianna a lot of
emotional trauma, and Vianna got really upset. It caused her sleeplessness and a lot of
11

hem1ache. He explained that: "Vianna is a very sensitive-by nature a very sensitive
person .. .if someone disparages her without recourse, or really without foundation of truth, it
affects her to the very core of her being." (Tr. P. 113, L. 4-5, 9, 13-14, 16, 19-20; p.114, L.
14-17).
Respondent offered into evidence the book titled Shady Healing as Exhibit 3 and
testified that the author of Shady Healing is Lindsey Stock and the publisher is actually
appellant. Respondent submitted the Articles of Organization for Right Way Publishing,
LLC, signed by appellant and Lindsey Stock and listing them both as co-managers as Exhibit
4. (Tr. p.47, L5-8, 16,20-24; See Appendix 2).
Respondent testified that anyone can still obtain Shady Healing, which states all of
these mean things, and breached appellant's promise not to make any disparaging,
defamatory, or negative comments about her. (Tr. pA2, L10-18, 21).
Respondent exclaimed that Shady Healing calls respondent's healing modality,
ThetaHealing, a cult and likens respondent to the "People's Temple, Manson Family, Branch
Davidians, etc." (Tr. p.48; L6, 21-22, 24-25; See page 2 and 469 of Exhibit 3).
Respondent revealed appellant's motivations to harm respondent. Respondent had
rejected (1) appellant's insistence that all respondent's teachers sign up under appellant's
multi-level vitamin marketing program, and (2) appellant's demand to pay her back for a bad
investment that appellant had made with respondent's son, Josh Opfar, who was Lindsey
Stock's former husband. (TR. p. 25, L 2-13; p. 26, L 10-24; p. 41, L. 4-5).
Respondent raised Judge Blower's findings in Lindsey Stock's ease with Josh Opfar,
quoting his decision that: "Lindsey has also authored a book, Shady Healing, primarily attacking
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Thetahealing, but also accusing Josh of lying, stealing, and fraud ... Lindsey's conduct has been
inequitable, unfair, and dishonest." (TR. pp. 249-250).
Respondent testified that Shady Healing refers to respondent's spinal surgery at page
374, and prints excerpts from her medical records at page 375 provided in the case she settled
with appellant. (Tr. p.49, L19, 21).
Respondent pointed out that Shady Healing contains excerpts from her deposition where
appellant's attomey Alan Johnston was asking questions of respondent in their settled case. (See
Exhibit 3, p. 379). Respondent testifies of the further disturbing excerpts from her deposition by
appellant's attomey, Alan Johnston appeared in Shady Healing on page 387 which begins with
his allegation that respondent was "faking cancer and making fraudulent claims."
More excerpts from her deposition taken on February 4th, 2010 appear on pages 391,
392, and 467 of Shady Healing. (Tr. p.51, L.I0-18, 21-22; p.52, L4-10, 21-22; p.53, L 3-8,2025).
Shady Healing's states the author's "intention is to show that the claims brought f01ih

regarding ThetaHealing are bogus, the root of the Theta tree is lies, deceit, fraud and the proofs
are exaggerated, claims of inconsistencies that have spread fi-om teacher, respondent, to students,
practitioners, and clients." (Tr. p.56, L.14-20, 23-24).
Shady Healing provides statements from a person named as Tyra who is actually the

appellant. Page 183 states: "Tyra had only contacted five people who wamed them that the
[ThetaHealing] doctorates were not valid, were in fact illegally given." (Tr. p.57, L. 19,22-25;
p.58, Ll, 4-12,17-18).
An e-mail from Tyra, aka appellant, is re-printed in Shady Healing on page 208 and
alleges that respondent is fraudulent and illegal, lies to her students, and accuses respondent
13

of misrepresentation. Appellant fmiher states respondent is not to be trusted on page 213.
(Tr. p.S8, L20, 22-25; p.59, L. 4-13; p.60, L. 9-20, p.61, L. 1,3-8).

Shady Healing quotes Tyra's, aka appellant's, email saying: "Oh, one last thing
from my attorney. How exactly did I breach my contract and license with you? Just
because you don't like the truth and had caught you being fraudulent and lying ... " (Tr.
p. 61, L.3-8; See Exhibit 3, p. 212).

Shady Healing further states that (1) respondent did not pay her taxes, (2) her school
is not legal, (3) respondent is selling fake doctorates and (4) respondent is scamming people.
(Tr. p.62, L. 9,13,15-18,21; p. 63, L. 4-10,14-15).

Shady Healing accuses respondent of cocaine use, saying she is a heavy drug user
using heroin and massive amounts of cocaine and stating that respondent confessed to
sleeping with anyone in order to pay for her cocaine. (See Exhibit 3, p.358). (Tr. p.65,
L. 10,13, 16-25; p. 67, L.1).

Shady Healing reprints an e-mail which says "ThetaHealing is dangerous," and
alleges that respondent's ThetaHealing friends end up dead at page 282. (Tr. p. 64, L 45,11-12,16-19; See Exhibit 3, p. 282).
Appellant also authenticated exhibit 1 as the settlement agreement she entered into
with respondent on July 30,2010. Appellant agreed that she read and signed the document.
She admitted that she and respondent agreed not to make any disparaging, defaming or
otherwise negative comments regarding each other from the date of the agreement on page 3,
paragraph 9 of exhibit 1. (Tr. p.149, L.25; p. 150; p.150, L.3-23; p.15!, L.5-23).
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Appellant testified that in the agreement she entered into with respondent on July 30,
2010, she and respondent agreed to keep confidential the terms of the agreement, all matters,
documents and medical records pertaining to the lawsuit. (Tr. p.152, L.2-12).
Appellant agreed that she received the respondent's check on July 30,2010, in the
sum of twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500), admitted as exhibit 2, and that the
check was the consideration that she had bargained for under the agreement, exhibit 1. (Tr.
p.152, L.19-25).
Appellant admitted further that in her deposition taken August 5, 2011, that she had
paid Sunrise Press on July 21,2010 for the printing of Shady Healing. She admitted that the
estimate and invoice presented to the court was probably the invoice from July 21,2010 and
that there were 500 copies of Shady Healing printed. (Tr. p.154, L.6-16, 25; See Exhibit E &
F; Appendix 3 & 4). She picked up the books which were printed by Sunrise Press and
delivered them to Lindsey Stock for distribution on August 2, 2010. (TR. p. 244 L. 14-25; p.
245, L. 1-4).
Appellant admitted that the paid invoice bears the date of July 21st, 2010, and she
paid for the printing of Shady Healing. (See Exhibit F, Appendix 4). The following day,
appellant fom1ed RWP, LLC, in the State of Utah. The articles of organization of RWP,
exhibit 4, reflects appellant's signature which she signed on July 22, 2010. Appellant agreed
that she is a co-manager ofRWP. Appellant also admitted that she is the registered agent for
RWP and that RWP's place ofbusiness is her home located at Saratoga Springs, Utah. She
confirmed that nine days before she entered into the agreement with respondent to settle the
lawsuit between the two of them is when, she paid for the printing of Shady Healing. (Tr.
p.156, L.9-16, 22-25; p.156, L.1-21; p.157, L.11-14).
15

Appellant acknowledged RWP's articles of organization were not accepted until July
22,2010, the day after she paid for the printing of the Shady Healing on July 21,2010. She
signed the LLC paperwork on July 22, 2010 and the date on the articles of organization for
RWP is July 22nd, 2010. Appellant testified that when she entered into the agreement with
respondent on July 30th, 2010, she knew about the printing of Shady Healing and R\VP,
which she formed to distribute Shady Healing, but, she nevertheless, agreed, not to make any
statements that were disparaging, defamatory, or otherwise negative towards respondent as
well as agreed not to disclose, or to keep confidential, all matters, documents, and medical
records relating to the lawsuit. (Tr. p.157, L.16-20; p.158, L.2-14, 18-25).
Appellant said that she had read Shady Healing and that page 374 of Shady Healing
has infom1ation including respondent's final surgical pathology of her surgery date of August
22, 1995. Appellant admitted that it is a medical record of respondent and that the medical
records were part ofthe lawsuit going on between her and respondent before July 30th, 2010
and the deposition of respondent taken by her lawyer, Alan Johnston (Tr. p.159, LA, 9-20,
22-25, p.160, L.1-4).
Appellant admitted that RWP is still publishing Shady Healing and that Shady
Healing is still available for purchase on Amazon. Appellant stated that she still is the coowner, co-manager, and registered agent ofRWP. (Tr. p.160, L.14-25; p.161, L.1).
Appellant confirmed that Shady Healing accused respondent of deceit, trickery,
lies, false teachings, stealing, misrepresentation, fraud, cocaine, heroin use, acid and
cultism. Appellant admits that she knew of these accusations before July 30, 2013, and
that these accusations disparaged and defamed respondent. (Tr. p. 161, L.7-24).
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Appellant admitted that additional excerpts from the transcript of a deposition of
respondent taken by her lawyer in the prior lawsuit are reprinted in Sha((v Healing on pages
337,379 and 387. (Tr. p.162, Ll-15).
Appellant stated that any references to Tyra in Shady Healing are her. She admitted that
page 380 of Shady Healing refers to some of respondent's interrogatory responses taken out of
her prior lawsuit with respondent which were in appellant's possession. She stated that there
are references to her attorney, Alan Johnston, on pages 388, 391, and 392. She agreed that the
excerpts from the deposition of respondent in the lawsuit which they had pending before the
agreement came from her attorney. (Tr. p.162, L16-17, 20-25; p.163, L.16-25, p.164, L.l, 1116).
Appellant acknowledged that she provided Lindsey Stock all of the information in
pages 337,379,380,381,388,389,391, and 392. Appellant admitted that all of the pages
referred to in Shady Healing had excerpts from depositions and the medical records of her prior
law suit with respondent. Appellant also confirmed that the above infoTIl1ation was
disseminated to third parties after July 20,2010 (Tr. p. 165, L. 3-7,16-25). Appellant
estimated that less than thirty (30) copies of Shady Healing have sold since July 30,2010 and
Shady Healing is priced at $29.95. She testified that there is money in the RWP's account from
sales of Shady Healing. (Tr. p.166, LA-8, 16-25, p.167, L.1-7).
At trial, appellant was reminded of about her prior deposition testimony, which reads in
relevant part:
Q: So you assumed since you hurried and printed Shady Healing
before your agreement that it would be okay to sell Shady
Healing after the agreement?

A: Yes.
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Q: Well, if allegations of deceit and trickery, lies, false teachings,
stealing, misrepresentation, fraud, disrespect, cocaine use
and cultism, if those are sent out to the public after July 30tb
don't you understand the harm that they may do?

A: Nope.
Q: So you cared about whether those words would harm Vianna
after you sent them out?

A: No, I did not.
Q: Didn't it bother You?
A: Didn't bother me.
Q: It was intended that Shady Healing, would be read by others;
wasn't it'?
A: Yes.
Q: Shady Healing, bad all the harmful words that I've talked to
you all morning about?

A: Yes.
Q: So is it your whole defense that someone else did this and you
had no connection to it?

A: Pretty much.
(Tr. p.l72, L.l 0-12, 18-23; p.l73, L.2-9, 14-25, p.174, L.1).
At trial, appellant testified in particular as to her exact knowledge of the contents of Shady
Healing as follows:
Q: You were aware of all of the excerpts from the depositions in
tbat lawsuit contained in that Shady Healing; isn't that true?

A: Yes.
Q: You knew that all the information was meant to be
confidential regarding all matters, documents, medical
records pertaining to the lawsuit in CV-2009-1852, you knew
that; didn 't you?
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A: Yes.

Q: Excerpts from the lawsuit, medical records, they were all
disseminated to the public after July 30th, 2010; weren't
they?

A: Yes, they're still available.
(Tr. p.174, L.5-7, 10-15,17-20).
Appellant admitted that she did not investigate any of the allegations before Shady
Healing was published. She said that she had no proof regarding the allegations of deceit,

trickery, lies, false teachings, stealing, misrepresentation, fraud, disrespect for the law,
cocaine, heroin usc and cultism. Appellant agreed that Shady Healing was not published by
accident and that she intended for it to be published. Appellant absolutely admitted that
allegations against someone with regard to the accusations described above would tend to
disgrace and degrade the person the accusations are alleged against. (Tr. p.175, 4-9, 17-25,
p.176, L.1-6).
As to the second paragraph of the fifth defense ofthe answer filed by appellant, she
testified that the allegations made against respondent in Shady Healing as referenced in
respondent's complaint were expressions of her opinion. (Tr. p.176, L.23-25; p.177, L.1621).

Appellant admitted that she had planned to distribute Shady Healing after the
agreement, and reiterated that Amazon is currently distributing Shady Healing. (Tr.
p.178, L5-11, 13-15,21-24; p.179, L.6-9).
Appellant verified she is a fifty (50) percent co-owner ofRWP. She financed Shady
Healing with her own money. Appellant's documents, emails, and deposition testimony from
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her lawsuit with respondent all show up in Shady Healing which is still being distributed
since July 30,2010. (Tr. p.20l, L.S-7, lS-2S; p.202, L.1-6).
Appellant admitted that she helped R WP publish Shady Healing by providing
payment to the printing company for printing Shady Healing and that R WP was not an entity
until July 22,2010. The money that comes into RWP from the sales of Shady Healings are
deposited into an account which appellant has the right to receive one-half of an equal share.
(Tr. p.206, L.22-24; p.208, L.S-7, 10-11, 16-2S; p.209, L.2-4).
RWP'S bank statements record when deposits were made for sales of Shady Healing
from September, 2010 to December, 2011. The bank statements specifically reflect deposits
for Shady Healing sales on page 6, 7, and on page 17 from Amazon.com during that period.
Appellant admitted that on October 26 th 2010 she deposited $SOO of her personal money into
RWP's bank account. (Tr. p.211, L.21-22; p.212, L.S-11, p.213, L.4-12; p.214, LA-lO; p.
21S, L.3-6, 11 19).
Appellant's name is on the bank account for R WP as a signatory owner. The bank
account has approximately one thousand twenty-three dollars ($1,023) which was money that
had been earned by RWP since July 30,2010. (Tr. p.280, L.23-2S; p.281, L.S-9, 23-2S;
p.282, L.18-25; p.283, L.20-21). RWP has no other assets. (Tr. p.176, L.15-2l).
Appellant sent Shady Healing to her attorney, Alan Johnston, who was present at the
settlement mediation with appellant and respondent. Appellant admitted she had read Shady
Healing prior to mediation, knew exactly what it contained and intended Shady Healing to be

distributed after the time she signed the agreement promising she would not say anything
disparaging, defamatory, or negative about respondent. (Tr. p.288, L.21-24; p.289, L.S-2S;
p.290, L.1-20).
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IV.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT
BREACHED HER AGREEMENT WITH RESPONDENT?
1.

"VAS APPELLANT SUBSTANTIALLY INVOLVED IN DISSE]\1INATll'JG
DISPARAGING, DEFAMATORY OR
NEGATIVE STATEMENTS ABOUT RESPONDENT AND
DISCLOSING ANY MATTERS, DOCUMENTS AND
MEDICAL RECORDS REGARDING RESPONDENT WHICH
WERE DISTRIBUTED AFTER APPELLANT AGREED NOT
TODOSO?

2.

DID APPELLANT PERSONALLY PAY FOR THE PRINTING
OF "SHADY HEALING"?

3.

WAS RIGHT WAY PUBLISHING FINANCED, MANAGED,
AND CONTROLLED BY APPELLANT BEFORE, DURING
AND AFTER JULY 30, 2010?

4.

DID i\PPELLANT PROFIT FROM SALES OF
"SHADY HEALING" AFTER JULY 30, 2010?

B.

WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT RESPONDENT
SUFFERED ACTUAL DAMAGES OF $6,250.00

C.

WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT THAT (1) APELLANT'S CONDUCT WAS
INTENTIONAL, EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS AND (2) PUNITIVE DAMAGES
OF $50,000 WERE APPROPRIATE?

D.

WAS THERE SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT?

V.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
An award of attorney fees may be granted if authorized by statute or contract.
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Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P. 3d 723 (2003); Idaho Code § 12-121; Hellar v.
Cenamlsa 106 Idaho 571, 682 P. 2d 524 (1984).
Paragraph eleven (11) of the appellant's agreement with respondent entitles the prevailing
party to attorney fees and costs for litigation under the agreement. (Exhibit 1; Appendix 1).
An award of attorney fees may be granted on appeal to the prevailing party under Idaho
Code § 12-121 and LAR. 41 "when this court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has
been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Minich v. Gem State
Developers, Inc. 99 Idaho 911, 591 P. 2d 1078 (1978).
"Attorney fees are awardable if an appeal does not more than simply invite an appellate
court to second guess the trial court on conflicting evidence." Sun Valley Shamrock Res. Inc v.
Travelers Lending Co. 118 Idaho 116, 120, 794 P. 2d 1389, 1393 (1990); Sprinkler Irrigation Co.
v. John Deere Ins. Co. 139 Idaho 667 P. 3d 667 (2004).
An appellate court may award fees and costs against a party and it's attorney who have
violated LAR. 11.1. Macleod v. Deed 126 Idaho 669, 671, 889 P. 2d 103, 105 (Ct. App, 1995).
An attorney who fails to conduct reasonable inquiry that the appeal be well-grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law has violated LAR. 11.1. Sprinkler Irrigation Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co.
139 Idaho 667 P. 3d 667 (2004).
All of appellant's arguments on appeal serve only to rehash or reweigh the facts and
indulge in a fiction that not even the appellant or her witness testified to without legal authority or
reason to vary from existing law. Appellant and her witness, Lindsey Stock, testified that the
payment for the printing of the Shady Healing occurred prior to the formation ofRWP. However,
appellant argues that "Right Way Publishing paid for the printing of the book, Shady Healing,
before July 30,2010," (see Appellant's Briefp. 17). The book printing was paid for on July 21,
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2010 according to appellant, Lindsey Stock, and appellant's exhibits E and F. RWP did not legally
exist on July 21,2013, and therefore, could not have paid for the printing.
As the facts above show and the legal arguments below reflect, attorneys fees and costs and
appeal should be awarded under all the above standards.
VI.

ARGUMENTS
1.

Standard of Review

The scope of judicial review on appeal was aptly addressed by Justice Boyle, writing:
"In an appellate review of a trial court decision we must always keep
in mind the respective roles assigned to the courts. At the trial level
the trier of fact, in this case the district court judge, is the arbiter of
conflicting evidence. Rankin v. Rankin 107 Idaho 621, 691 P.2d
1236 (1984). It is the province of the trier of fact to weigh
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of
witnesses. LR.C.P. 52(a); Pointer v. Johnson 107 Idaho 1014, 695
p.2d 399 (1985); Glenn v. Gotzinger, 106 Idaho 109,675 P.2d 1333
(1982);Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021,772 P.2d 228 (Ct.App.
1988). In view of this role, the trial court's findings of fact will be
liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered. Rueth v. State
103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982); Jensen v. Bledsoe 100 Idaho
84, 593 P.2d 988 (1979). Trial court's findings and conclusions
which are based on substantial although conflicting evidence will not
be disturbed on appeal. The credibility and weight to be given
evidence is in the province of the trier of fact, and the findings made
by the trial judgment will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
Pointer v. Johnson, 107 Idaho 1014, 695 P.2d 399 *1392 (1985);
Macneil v. Minidoka Memorial Hosp., 108 Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208
(1985). It is with these guiding principles in mind that we undertake
our review ofthe instant appeal."
Sun Valley Shamrock v. Travelers Leasing, 118 Idaho 116,794 p.2d 1389.(1990)
A.

THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT
BREACHED HER AGREEMENT WITH RESPONDENT.
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District Judge Jon J. Shindurling entered the following findings fact regarding respondent's
breach of contract claim against appellant:
"Shady Healing is a book written by Lindsey Stock, who is the former daughter-inlaw of Vianna. Shady Healing was published by RWP, LLC. Shady Healing
contains disparaging, defaming, or otherwise negative comments about
Vianna. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 3; Trial Tr. 161:19-24. An invoice from Sunrise
Press LLC, admitted at trial as Defendants' Exhibit F, show that Shady
Healing was printed on July 21, 2012 and was paid for by April Fano. The
Articles of Organization of Right Way Publishing, LLC, admitted as Defendants'
Exhibit C at trial; show that R\VP, LLC was formed on July 22, 2010. April's
home address is listed as the company's designated office and its principal place of
business. The company's registered agent is listed at April Fano and her home
address is again listed as the company's registered office. The company is comanaged and its two managers are April Fano and Lindsey Stock. Shac(v Healing
has been sold to the public since the Release Agreement was entered and is still
available for purchase on Amazon. Trial Tr. 161: 16- i 8. Before the Reiease
Agreement was signed, April provided Lindsey Stock with emails and portions
of depositions from her previous lawsuit with Vianna. Trial TR. 193:3-195:23.
April denied giving Lindsey Stock any medical records. Trial Tr. 160:11-13.
April knew about the contents of Shady Healing before she signed the Release
Agreement. April testified that she intended to publish Shady Healing and
intended that Shady Healil1g would be read by others. Trial Tr. 173:21-176:1."
R. Vol. I, pp. 44-45.
Based upon the trial court's findings of fact and the above record the trial court
entered the conclusions of law as follows:
"Paragraph 8 of the Release Agreement requires April to keep confidential all
matters, documents and medical records pertaining to the previous lawsuit between
her and Vianna. Paragraph 9 of the Release Agreement prohibits April and Vi anna
from making any disparaging, defaming, or otherwise negative comments regarding
each other to any third party as of the date of the Release Agreement. There is no
question that Shady Healing contains disparaging, defaming, or otherwise negative
comments about Vianna. In addition, Shady Healing contains documents that April
gave to Lindsey Stock that are from April's previous lawsuit with Vi anna.
Therefore, the only question before the Court is whether April's involvement in the
publishing of Shady Healing combined with the fact that Shady Healing was sold to
the public after the Release Agreement was entered violated paragraphs 8 and 9 of
the Release Agreement.
April's involvement was substantial, and included: (1) giving Lindsey Stock
emails and portions of depositions from her previous lawsuit with Vianna; (2)
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paying for Shady Healing to be printed; (3) forming R\VP, LLC together with
Lindsey Stock to publish Shady Healing; and (4) receiving bank statement for
RWP, LLC. Based on April's substantial involvement in publishing Shady
Healing, it is the determination of this Court that April is responsible for the
comments expressed in Shady Healing and for the documents contained in
Shady Healing from the previous lawsuit with Vianna.
This includes
comments made by April under the name Tyra and those made by the author.
Based on the evidence before the Court, Shady Healing would not have beeu
published but for April's substantial involvement. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of
the Release Agreement do not excuse April from liability. As Shady Healing
was sold after the date of the Release Agreement, and continues to be sold
today, April has breached the Release Agreement by making disparaging,
defaming, or otherwise negative comments about Vianna and by failing to keep
confidential documents related to their previous lawsuit.
In making this determination, it is not necessary for this Court to analyze the
arguments made by Viam1a regarding a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing: or anv alter eg:o arg:uments re£ardim!: Amil and RWP. LLC.
"-'

.t

'"-'

'--'

'-"......,
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The Court recognizes the arguments made by April that her actions in forming
R WP, LLC and paying for the printing of Shady Healings were not improper
because she did not anticipate settling her case on July 30, 2010. While that may be
tme, it is not an excuse fur failing to disclose the existence of Shady Healing once it
became clear that she would agree to the requirements contained in the Release
Agreement.
The Court simply cannot allow April to fraudulently enter into a release
agreement and agree not to make certain comments or disclose eertain
documents when she knows that a Shady Healing she helped publish and paid
to print would soon be for sale to the public doing those same things. April did
nothing to disclose the existence of Shady Healing and did nothing to attempt
to stop it from being sold to the public."
R. Vol. I, pp. 46-47.

1.
APPELLANT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY INVOLVED IN DISSEMINATING
DISPARAGING, DEFAMATORY OR NEGATIVE STATEMENTS
ABOUT RESPONDENT AND DISCLOSING ANY MATTERS,
DOCillv1ENTS MEDICAL RECORDS REGARDING RESPONDENT
WHICH WERE DISTRIBUTED AFTER APPELLANT AGREED NOT TO
DO SO.

Appellant supplied Lindsey Stock with appellant's emails to respondent, respondent and
her attorney's degrading opinions of respondent, respondent's deposition transcripts and
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discovery from the defamation suit respondent sought to settle. Appellant read the book and
shared it with her attorney.
She personally paid for the printing of the book which included the infoill1ation above
she personally provided to Lindsey Stock. Shady Healing included excerpts from respondent's
medical records which were produced to appellant in their prior lawsuit.
Two days after appellant the settlement agreement was signed with respondent, appellant
hand delivered the five hundred (500) printed copies of the book to Lindsey Stock for
pUblication and distribution to the pUblic.
Appellant disguised herself in the book as the woman named as "Tyra" as a source of
certain defamatory information aimed at respondent.
Appellant created the LLC, RWP attempting to hide her true involvement in the
publication of the book.
She co-owned and co-managed RWP to control the book. She deposited her own
personal money into RWP's account.
RWP received proceeds from book sales which appellant is entitled to.
2.
APPELLANT PERSONALLY PAID FOR THE PRINTING OF
THE "SHADY HEALING".
On July 21,2010, an estimate from Sunrise Press, LLC was provided to April Fano
[Appellant], aprilfano@msn.com to print five htmdred (500) books in the sum of four thousand
seven hundred eighty dollars ($4,780). (See Appellant's Exhibit E; Appendix 2). On this same
day of July 21,2010, an invoice was provided, bill to RWP as paid in full, per April Fano
[Appellant]. (See Exhibit F, Appendix 4).
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On July 22,2010, one day after the printing of the book was paid for, April Fano,
appellant, signed an article of organization for Right Way Publishing, LLC received by the
Utah State Div. of Corp. on July 22,2010. (See Exhibit 4; Appendix 2).
RWP was not fonned until after the printing bill was paid for by appellant personally.
RWP was not legally in existence until after the printing bill was in existence.
As a matter of law, RV/P could not have paid for the printing bill. As a matter of fact,
April Fano admitted to paying for the printing (See Exhibit E; Appendix 3). Lindsey Stock,
Appellant's co-manager and author of Shady Healing testified that the money for the printing
of the book came from April Fano, prior to the day that appellant and Stock formed Right Way
Publishing. (TR. P. 255, L.5-11).
However, appellant affirmatively represented to this Court that RWP, LLC paid for the
printing of the book Shady Healing before July 30,2013 at page 17 of her opening brief, which
her attorney, Alan Johnston signed on page 33.
3.
RWP WAS FINANCED, MANAGED, AND CONTROLLED BY APPELLANT
BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER JULY 30,2010.
Benefiting from her LLC's transactions are a factor in the alter-ego doctrine. Surety
Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc. 95 Idaho 599, 574 P. 2d 554 (1973).
The Supreme Court addressed the application ofthe alter ego doctrine to prevent
injustice in Tom Nakamura, Inc v. G.&G. Produce Company, Inc., 93 Idaho 182,457 P.2d 422
(1969) and mled that:
'We hold that the judgment of the trial court dismissing the actions as
to Lonnie and June Garrison, as individuals, was erroneous on such
portion of the trial court's decision is reversed. As this Court said in
Hayhurst v. Boyd., 50 Idaho 752, 300 P.895 (1931):
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'To warrant casting aside the legal fiction of
distinct corporate existence *** it must also be
shown that there is such a unity of interest and
ownership that the individuality of such
corporation and such person has ceased; and it
must further appear from the facts that the
observance of the fiction of separate existence
would, under the circumstances, sanction a fraud
or promote injustice.'
Accord, Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879
(1966), and Metz v. Hawkins, 64 Idaho 386,133 P.2d 721 (1943).
It is undisputed in the record before us that the Garrisons, as
individuals, were in effect the alter ego of G. & G. corporation or

vice versa, and that there was such a unity of ownership and interest
between the individuals and the corporation as to make them
indistinguishable. The assets, interest and dehts of the Garrisons
and G. & G. corporation were so intertwined as to make the
distinction between them as individuals and as a corporation
merely a distinction without a difference. We hold, therefore,
that the corporate entity in this case must be disregarded to
prevent injustice and that June and Lonnie Garrison should be
held personally liable for these debts contracted in the name of
the corporation.
As herein mentioned, the district court dismissed the actions as to
Max Lehman personally. There is nothing in the record before us
which in any way indicates that Lehman was privy to any of the
transactions bringing about the indebtedness of the corporation to
Nakamura and/or Warnock. The record is devoid of any indication
that Lehman personally benefited in any way from any of the
transactions in question or had any contact with G. & G. corporation
or with plaintiffs or either of them. It is, therefore, obvious that the
trial court was correct in its action in dismissing Lehman as a
defendant in the action and such portion of the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
The stipulated facts indicate that \Vilford and Betty Hess were the
sole stockholders of both Hess Distributing and Rose Chapel and
that Wilford Hess was the president and manager of both
corporations. While that fact would not be conclusive evidence that
Wilford and Betty Hess were doing business as individuals, it
indicates the degree of control over both corporations which the
Hesses possessed. In addition to possessing absolute control over the
management and operation of the corporations, the parties stipulated
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that the Hesses operated both the distributing company and the
mortuary business without regard for corporate procedures and
formalities ...
Further evidence of the fact that the separate identities of the Hesses
and the corporations had ceased can be seen in Wilford Hess's
deposition concerning the relationship between Hess Distributing
and Rose Chapel wherein he stated, 'One helps the other.' Indeed,
one did help the other. Hess Distributing provided funds to cover
labor costs incurred in the construction of the mortuary.
'Wilford and Betty Hess used the two corporations merely
as a conduit through which to conduct their personal business
ventures and that the separate identities of Wilford and Betty
Hess and the corporations had ceased."
95 Idaho at 602-603, 574 P.2d at 597-598.
In Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 845, 761 P.2d 1169, 1197 (1988) our
Supreme Court addressed additional factors were established for applying the alter ego
doctrine to prevent formation of a subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud as follows:
"In Idaho, we ... have recognized that corporate identity may be
disregarded where an individual had such a unity or interest and
ownership that separate personalities of the corporation and
individual no longer exist and where, if the acts at issue are treated
as those of a corporation, and inequitable result would ensue. Chick
v. Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483, 531 P.2d 573 (1975); Surety Life Ins.
Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599, 514 P.2d 594
(1973). Factors which influence whether the corporate veil will
be pierced (and a subsidiary deemed an 'alter ego' ofthe parent)
include the obvious under-capitalization of the subsidiary; the
failure of either the parent or subsidiary to adhere to corporate
formalities; and the formation of the subsidiary to perpetrate a
fraud. United States v. Jon-T Chemical, Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.
1985); Middendorfv. Fugua Industries, Inc., 623 F.2d 13 (6th Cir.
1980).
Regardless of the rubric under which liability is found (i.e.
recognition of corporateness or not), the courts have tended to look
for factors denoting the existence of 'control,' 'domination,' or
'unity of purpose,' or subsidiary as a 'mere instrumentality.'
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Appellant and Lindsey both have conspicuous common interests or motivations. Both
were extremely upset with Respondent and her son, Josh Opfar. Lindsey Stock was hurt and
angry with Josh Opfar for leaving her for another woman and blames Vianna and ThetaHealing
(Exhibit 3, p.I-492). Appellant was upset with Josh over money she invested and lost with him.
Appellant was upset with Vianna for not paying her back for Josh's debt and rejecting
Appellant's pressure to promote April's multi-level vitamin marketing business through
Viam1a's teachers and students. Appellant and Lindsey's anger united in hate, produced the
malicious, vengeful accusations appearing in Shady Healing.
Apellant supplied respondent's confidential infonnation and Appellants's derogative emails referring to Respondent over to Lindsey which she included in Shady Healing. Appellant
read Shady Healing and had her attomeys read it. Appellant personally arranged with Sunrise
Press to print five hundred (500) copies of Shady Healing. And Appellant used her own,
personal money to pay for the printing of Shady Healing.
The day after Appellant personally paid for the printing, she and Lindsey fonned "Right
Way" Publishing, LLC as co-owners and co-managers, listing Appellant as registered agent
and her home as the address for their LLC. Appellant opened and controls the bank account for
her LLC in which proceeds of Shady Healing sales were deposited.
Appellant's co-owner and co-manager, Lindsey, began distributing the Shady Book on
the intemet and through Amazon.com. April's LLC's bank statements reflect (1) a deposit of
$500.00 of April's personal funds which she deposited and commingled in the account to pay
for her LLC's expenses in October of 201 0, and (2) deposits for the book sales from October of
2010 through May of 20 11. April's LLC recorded sales which she has a one-half interest in.
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The balance of her LLC account as of November, 2011 was approximately eleven hundred
dollars ($1100).
Appellant's LLC was undercapitalized from its inception. The only funds Appellant's
LLC banked was from book sales and a $500.00 deposit from Appellants's personal funds. Its

assets are $1100 and il1sufficient to address

all y
T

meaningful judgment for 1-1er COlldllCt.

Appellant fom1cd the LLC to perpetrate a fraud upon Respondent by (1) pretending to
bargain in good faith by promising not to do any ofthe things she was in fact planning to do
and (2) trying to cover up her involvement to Shady Healing with a supposed separate entity.
She had her partner, Lindsey; remove her name from Shady Healing by using the pseudonym
of Tyra when Appellant was speaking in the book.
Corporate, LLC formalities were not observed. Appellant personally arranged for the
printing and paid for the printing of Shady Healing before she formed an LLC. April
comingled her personal funds in her LLC's account which she controls.
The sole purpose of her LLC was to market the book she could not do personally.
Appellant, Lindsey, and Appellant's LLC's common interest were united. Appellant's LLC was
the subterfuge she employed to evade her contract with Respondent. Justice requires that
Appellant be held personally liable for the instmmentalities of alter ego LLC.
4.
APPELLANT DID PROFIT FROM SALES OF "SHADY HEALINO"
AFTER JULY 30, 2010?
Appellant is a co-owner of R WP and its bank account, which received deposits from
the sales of Shady Healing after July 30, 2013. There is eleven hundred dollars ($1100) in
profit for the co-owner.
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B.

THERE WERE FINDINGS OF SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT
RESPONDENT SUFFERED ACTUAL DAMAGES OF $6,250.00.
"A substantial or material breach of contract is one which touches the fundamental
purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract.
Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 740, 536 P. 2d *511 729,735 (1975); see also
Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. Parkcenter Mall Assocs., 122 Idaho 261, 265,833 P. 2d 119, 123
(Ct.App 1992)," Erwin Conty. Co. v. Van Ordem, 125 Idaho 695 at 699-700,8740 .2d506 at
509-511 (Sup. Crt 2002).
"The requirement for recovery is that the damages be proved with reasonable certainty
and second that they were within the contemplation of the parties. Brown's Tie & Lumber v.
Chicago Title, 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P. 2d 423,428 (1988) (citing Nelson v. World Wide
Lease, Inc., 110 Idaho 369, 378, 716 P.2d 513,522 (Ct.App.1986»," Cuddy Mountain
Concrete, Inc. v. Citadel Constmction, Inc, 121 Idaho 220 at 225,824 P.2d 157 at 156 (Crt.
App 1992).
"Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise naturally from the
breach and are reasonably foreseeable. Appel v. Lepage, 135 Idaho 133, 15 P .3d 1141 (2000).
Damages need not have been precisely and specifically foreseeable, but only such as were
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time they contracted. Id.: Suitts v. First Sec. Bank
ofIdaho, N.A.. 110 Idaho 15,22, 713 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1985)," Silver Creek Computers, Inc.
v. Petra, Inc, 136 Idaho 879 at 884, 42 P.3d 672 at 677 (2002).
Respondent paid twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500) to appellant under the
agreement which provided (1) mutual release of the parties' claims, (2) mutual promise not to
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disparage or defame each other, (3) mutual promises to remove any references to each other for
the future and (4) a promise not to disclose medical records or documents or documents from
their suit.
Appellant substantially, materially, and maliciously breached two of the above four
essential elements oftlle agreement. Certainly, it '.vould be within the contemplation of
appellant that if she failed to perform her promises, that the money she received for that would
be returned to respondent. It would likewise be reasonable for respondent to receive money
she paid for something bargained for but not received.
The trial court determined that respondent's damages were six thousand two hundred
fifty dollars ($6, 250) which is roughly half of the consideration respondent paid appellant and
the part of purchase price appellant did not earn because of her breach of contract. The award
was clearly foreseeable and reasonably related to appellant's breach of two of the fundamentals
purposes of the agreement.
Appellant's conduct shattered the covenant of good faith and fail implied in every
contract. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration Inc .. 134 Idaho 738, 9 P. 3d 1204.

c.
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION THAT (1) RESPONDENTS
CO~T)UCT WAS INTENTIONAL, EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS AND (2) PUNITIVE
DAMAGES WERE APPROPRIATE.
On the respondent's claim for punitive damages, the trial court ruled that:
"First, the Court finds that April's substantial involvement in the
publishing of Shady Healing coupled with her not disclosing the book at
mediation and the book being sold after the Release Agreement was intentional
conduct by April. April testified at trial that she intended to publish the book
and intended that the book would be read by others .... April paid for and
published the book Shady Healing, which contains countless disparaging,
defaming, or otherwise negative comments about Vianna and documents from
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April and Vianna's previous lawsuit that were provided to the author by April.
Nine days later, April promised not to make any disparaging, defaming, or
negative comment about Vianna and to keep confidential documents related to
the previous lawsuit between her and Vi anna. She never disclosed the existence
of Shady Healing. She did not do anything to try and stop the book from being
sold to the pUblic. She did nothing, as she assumed that because the book was
published and printed before the Release Agreement, it would be okay to sell
the book after the Release Agreement. Trial Tr. 172: 18-173: 1. Breaching a
contract in this manner is extreme and outrageous. It is even more extreme
and outrageous in this situation because the Release Agreement was a
contract that settled all claims which were pending before the court in a
previous lawsuit between April and Vianna. April promised not to make
and disparaging, defaming, or negative comments about Vianna and to
keep confidential certain documents and received substantial consideration
for those promises while knowing the entire time that a book she paid to
have printed would soon be sold and would make countless comments that
she was prohibited from making and disclose documents she was required
to keep confidentiaL .. As discussed above, April's conduct in this case was
outrageous. April knew at the mediation that she had funded and helped
publish Shady Healing. The book was printed nine days before the
mediation. Aprils admits that her book contains countless comments in
violations of the Release Agreement and contains documents from a
previous lawsuit between Vianna and April, both of which are a violation
of the Release Agreement April agreed to and signed. April did all of this
knowing that this book, which violated the Release Agreement she was
signing, would be sold to the public after the agreement was entered. As
explained above, April's conduct is even more extreme and outrageous in this
situation because the Release Agreement was a contract that settled all claims
that were pending before the court in a previous lawsuit between April and
Vianna. April's conduct was an "extreme deviation from reasonable standards
of conduct" and was performed with "a disregard for its likely consequences."
As such, punitive damages are appropriate in this case. The Court award
Vianna $50,000.00 in punitive damages .... Punitive damages may be awarded
when: "there has been an injury to the plaintiff from an act which is an extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was
performed by the defendant with an understanding of or a disregard for its
likely consequences ... " Linscott v. Rainier Life Ins. Co. 100 Idaho 854, 606
P.2d 958 (1980).

CR. pp. 53-54)

In Linscott, supra, the insurance company defendant had unilaterally changed

terms, wrongfully attempted to rescind policies, and refused to pay valid claims, reSUlting in a
proper award for punitive damages.
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In Barlow v. International Harvester Co .. 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102 (1974), this Court
upheld an award of punitive damages where the defendant's agent contaeted plaintiffs business
partner and made false statements that the plaintiff had misappropriated funds and was (1)
incapable of managing the business, (2) a liar, (3) thief, (4) and should be put in jail.
In Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897,904-05665 P. 2d 661,668-69
(1983), and; this Court reminded us of the measure of punitive damages, in its dissent as follows:
We hold punitive damage awards are in the first instance a jury decision,
subj ect to the trial court's authority to modify or overturn that jury verdict as
a matter of law. Such is no novel approach to the appellate treatment of a
damage issue. See Boise Dodge, supra; Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho
463,220 P.2d 682 (1950); Hom v. Boise City Canal Co., 7 Idaho 640, 65 P.
145 (1901); T.R.CP. 59(a)(5). 'Ve have consistently held that "punitive
damages are be their very nature incapable of definite ascertainment and
cannot be governed or measured by any precise standards." Cox v.
Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 688, 496 P. 2d 687. Pmdential Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Johnson, 93 Idaho 850, 476 P. 2d 786 (1970). "Thus the tme
basis for an award of one amount of punitive damages as opposed to another
amount lies in the overall appraisal of the circumstances of the case." Boise
Dodge, Supra, 92 Idaho 908,453, P.2d 557.
In Idaho, "An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal only
when it is shown that the defendant acted in a manner that was an "extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was
performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its
likely consequences." Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest 100 Idaho
851,606 P. 2d 955. The justification for punitive damages must be that the
defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether the state
be telmed "malice, oppression, fraud, or gross negligence" (Morrison v.
Quality Produce, Inc. 92 Idaho 448, 444 P. 2d 409 (1968)); "malice,
oppression, wantonness (Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 171, 118 P. 2d 729
(1941)); or simply "deliberate or willful (White v. Doney, 82 Idaho 217, 351
P. 2d 380 (1960)). See generally Linscott 100 Idaho 858, 606 P. 2d 962;
Thompson v. Dalton, 95 Idaho 785, 788, 520 P. 2d 240, 243 (1974).
First of all, when parties are entering a contract, it is neither a normal or reasonable standard
of conduct to be actively and secretly working on a way to breach a contract before, during, and
after the contract as appellant has done. To do so was extremely bad faith and a galaxy far, far,
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away from fair dealing or nornlal standards of conduct. April absolutely admits that she did not
care how Shady Healing would harm Vianna.
The law defines outrageous as an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct of
an ordinary person. Webster's Dictionary defines outrageous as "monstrous, heinous, atrocious,
mean, enormously or flagrantly bad," stating "something outrageous violates even the lowest
standard of what is right or decent" ... (Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms, p. 585 (1978).
What more malicious things can be said about a person that saying (1) a person lies, steals,
deceives, misrepresents, commits fraud, practices occultism, uses cocaine and heroin, and
prostitutes themselves to buy drugs; and (2) a person's friends come up dead, infelTing that the
person is a murderer.
Appellant callously, intentionally, and recklessly helped publish a book without ever
verifying the truth or falsity of these telTible, disparaging words. She did so after promising she
would not while accepting ample compensation for her promise. She read the book and knew of
the severity of accusations made. In fact, she supplied information printed in the book after she
agreed not to reveal this information. Both she and her attorney were quoted in the book. She
spoke under the alias of Tyra to hide her identity.
How much more devious can one get than to go into a settlement meeting knowing of the
atrocious allegations contained in a book the person is promoting and promise to another person's
face that you will not defame her, then sign, accept money, and thereafter, publish extremely
hurtful words about that person behind their back?
Appellant's aggregious behavior cries out for an award of damages to deter her from
further outrageous and malicious behavior. Ten times respondent's actual damages is a reasonable
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amount to give appellant an appreciation of how seriously wrong her behavior was and how
quickly she must stop publication of this malicious book.
D.

THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.
Attomey fees may be granted if authorized by statue or contract, Bellar v. Cenarrusa
106 Idaho 571, 682 P. 2d 524 (1984). The party seeking fees under contract must point to the
provision which it relies upon for authority for such an award Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho
364, 79 P. 3d 723 (2003).
Paragraph 11 ofthe appellant and respondent agreement provides that: "Tn the event of
litigation relating to this agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to attomey fees and
costs." (Exhibit 1; Vol 1. p. 73, Appendix 1).
An award ofattomey fees may be based on IRCP 54 (e)(1) under Idaho Code § 12-121

if it appears "from the facts presented to it that the case was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation," Sun Valley Shopping v. Idaho Power 119
Idaho 87, 90, 203 P. 2d 993,996 (1991). "The sole question [under Rule 54 (e)(I)] is whether
the losing party's position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation" Swenson v. Hemmann 119 Idaho 497, 498-99, 777 P. 2d 269,270-71
(1989).
Respondent was the prevailing party by any measure. The paramount issue of breach
of contract and substantive issues of punitive damages was resoundingly resolved in
respondent's favor. Respondent originally sought in excess of seventy-two thousand five

37

hundred dollars ($72,500) in her complaint and was awarded a final judgment of eight-four
thousand four hundred thirty-six dollars and seventy cents ($84,436.70).
Appellant's assertion of unclean hands was easily discarded by the trial court as
respondent performed her pali under the agreement by removing any references to appellant
from her website. (R. Vol 1. pp. 47-48)
Appellant's superficial attempt to claim that had someone other than her disparaged and
defamed respondent and disclosed respondent's medical records and information was
definitively not supported by the facts or the law.

c.
APPELLANT DID PROFIT FROM SALES OF THE "SHADY HEALING" AFTER
JULY 30, 2010.
Appellant is a co-owner ofRWP and its bank account, which received deposits from
the sales of Shady Healing after July 30,2010. Her profit is on deposit.

VII.
CONCLUSION
Respondent's breach of contract case was well proven. Appellant's conduct was
absolutely outrageous; the trial comis award was firmly grounded in the law and facts of the
case. Judge Shindurling's judgment should be affirmed with fees and costs awarded to
respondent.
Respectfully submitted this

~~&afOctober, 2013
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on October

20l3, I served a true copy of the foregoing

document on the attomey(s)/person(s) listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or
by causing the same to be hand delivered.
Attorney(s)lPerson(s) served:

Method of Service:

Idaho Supreme COUli
P.O. Box 83820
Boise, ID 83720-0020

Mailing

Vianna Stibal
1615 Curlew Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83406

Mailing

Alan Johnston
Pike Herndon Stosich & Johnston
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949

Mailing

C. Morales
Legal Assistant
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Appendix 1

lYIUTUAL RELEASE , HOLD HARIVILESS, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND SETTLElVlENT
AGREEMENT

This Mutual Release, Hold Harmless, Confidentiality, and Settlement Agreement
("Agreement") is entered by and between Vianna Stibal, Vier,na's Nature's Path, Inc., Nature's
Path, Inc, and the ThetaHealing Institute of Knowledge, its successors in interests, assignees and
assigns and surviving entities by acquisition (hereinafter collecti vely referred to as "Vi anna"),
and April Fano ("April") as follows:

RE CITALS
A. Vianna and April were involved in Bonneville County Idaho District Court, Case No.
CV -2009-1852 (hereinafter, the "Lawsuit"). Vianna brought the Lawsuit with claims for
defamation, libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. April countersued
with claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment
B. Vianna and April have agreed to resolve the dispute pursuant to the terms of this

Agreement

AGREEMENT
In consideration of the foregoing promises, and the mutual covenants and agreements
reflected herein, the parties to this Agreement agree as follo ws:

A. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
1.

The above-mentioned recitals are incorporated herein by reference.

2.

Neither party admits liability regarding any claim made against each other.

"'--iIIIII!!IIIIIII.

.'.
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. That V ianna agrees to execute a personal guarantee for a separate judgment debt
held by April against a third party for claims separate, distinct, and wholly unrelated to the
claims in the Lawsuit.
4.

The Parties agree to release each other, and hold each other hannless for any act

of the Parties which offered before the date of this Agreement, whether known or unknown.
5.

Vianna and April, for themselves, and for each, their respective heirs, executors,

administrators, lienholders, predecessors, successors and assigns does hereby fully and forever
remise, release and discharge one another, their related corporations, successor corporations,
affiliated companies, investors, insurers, partnerships, partners, trusts, trustees, beneficiaries,
heirs, personal representatives, predecessors, successors, assigns, directors, officers, employees,
agents and attorneys, release and hold each other harmless from any and all claims, liabilities,
actions, causes of action known and unlmown, demands, rights, damages, costs, attorneys' fees,
loss of profit, expenses and compensation whether related or not unrelated to the Lawsuit, this
Settlement, or any other connection between the Parties except as specifically set forth herein.
6.

Both Parties are accepting their mutual releases and agreement to hold each other

hannless as set forth in this Agreement in consideration in dismissing their suit against each
other solely and only based on the uncertainty ofthe legal system.
7.

April and Vianna understand and agree that this Agreement is a compromise of

disputed claims, and that this Agreement is not to be construed as and is not an admission of
liability on the part of the party or parties released.
8.

April and Vianna agree to keep confidential the tem1S of tills Agreement, as well

as all matters, documents and medical records peliaining to the Lawsuit unless:
a.

')

I~FLFASF

Ordered to do so by a court of law,

AGRFFMFNT

b.

Upon the request of a law enforcement office acting in his or her official
capacity,

c.

Confidential disclosure to an accountant or tax adviser in connection with
preparation of income tax returns or other financial documents is
necessary;

d.
9.

Agreed to by the parties.

April and Vianna agree not to make any disparaging, defaming, or otherwise

negative comment regarding each other to any third party as of the date of this Agreement
forward urJeSS:
a.

Ordered to do so by a court of law,

b.

Upon the request of a lawenforcement office acting in his or her official
capacity,

c.
10.

Agreed to by the pm1ies.

April and Vianna agree to remove any COlmnent regarding each other that is

posted on the internet, for which each one of them has control, within 45 days of this agreement.
April shall make a good faith etfort to have the video of Vimma posted on Vl'vVW. voutube.com
regarding USANA removed, and will provide Vianna's attorney with a copy of any
correspondence sent in an effort to remove said video.

11.

The confidentiality and nondisclosure requirements of this mutual release and

hold harmless agreement shall not apply to any statements, disclosures, or other communications
to third parties made before the date of this Agreement, whether known aT
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12.

The mutual release and hold harmless agreement shall apply to any statements,

disclosures, or other communications to third parties made before the date of this Agreement,
whether known or unknown.
13.

Both parties shall be responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs associated

with the Lawsuit.

B. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1.

Readin2:, Understanding: and Advisabili!y: This Agreement has been carefully

read, and the contents hereof are known and understood by all, and it is sig11ed freely by each
person executing this Agreement. Prior to the execution of this Agreement by each party, each
party hereto has had the opportunity to receive independent legal advice by that party's attorneys
with respect to the advisability of making the releases desClibed herein and with respect to the
advisability of executing this Agreement.
2.

Representations. Except as expressly stated in this Agreement, no party hereto

has made any statement or representation to any other party regarding any fact relied upon by the
other party entering into this Agreement, and each party specifically does not rely upon any
statement, representation or promise of any other party in executing this Agreement, except as
expressly stated in this Agreement.
3.

Investi!mtions. To the extent possible, each party and its, his or her attorneys

have made such investigation of the facts pertaining to this settlement, this Agreement, and all
matters pertaining thereto, as they deem necessary. The parties hereto agree and acknowledge
that they, or any of them, may hereafter discover facts different from or in addition to those they,
or any of them, now know or believe to be true with respect to the matters released and settled

RELEASE AGREEMENT

)

herein, and the parties specifically agree that all of the tenns of this Agreement shall be and will
remain effective in all aspects, regardless of such different or additional facts which may be
learned.
4.

Integration. This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated, YVTitten contract

expressing the entire agreement of the parties hereto relative to the subject matter hereof. No
covenants, agreements, representations, or warranties of any kind whatsoever have been made by
any party hereto, except as specifically set forth in this Agreement All prior discussions and
negotiations have been and are merged and integrated into, and are superseded by this
Agreement.
5.

Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with, and be

governed by, the laws of the State ofIdaho.
6.

Further Assurances. Each of the parties hereto agrees to take such further action

and execute all such further documents as may be necessary or appropriate in order to
consummate the settlement and release contemplated hereby.
7.

No Assignment. The parties hereto hereby warrant and represent that they, and

each of them, have made no assiglID1ent, voluntary or involuntary, of all or any part of the claims
released herein to any other person or entity.
8.

Drafting. This Agreement shall be construed without regard as to which party

drafted the Agreement, and this Agreement shall be construed as if all parties hereto participated
equally in the drafting of the Agreement.
9.

Survival. Wherever possible, each provision of this Agreement shall be

interpreted in such a manner as to be valid under applicable law, but if any provision of this
Agreement shall be invalid, or prohibited thereunder, such provision shaH be ineffective to the

5. RELEASE AGREEMENT

extent of such prohibition without invalidating the remainder of such provision or the remaining
provisions ofthis Agreement
10.

Confidentialij:y. Except as provided in pru:agraph 6 above, the parties hereto

represent and agree that they will keep the terms and facts of this Settlement Agreement
completely confidential and that they will not disclose any information concerning this
Settlement Agreement to anyone.
11.

Attornevs' Fees and Costs. In the event of litigation relating to this Agreement,

the prevailing party shall be entitled to attorneys) fees and costs.
12.

r n l.mterp::1rts qnd Farsimile Signatmcs.

counterparts, and/or by facsimile signatures.
The undersigned have read the foregoing Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement and
full y understand it

DATED:

r!]~ 3CJ

-

~QlO

Vianna StibaI, Vianna's Nature's Path, Inc,
Nature's Path, Inc, and the ThetaHealing Institute of
Knowledge

BY:~-z/~/~

Vianna Stibal
In her individual capacity, and as president of all
businesses listed above.

DATED:

6. RELEASE AGREEMENT

')

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

DATED:

r

J
"' - 'Stible, Vianna's Nature's
Path, Inc, Nature'~Path, Inc, and the
ThetaHeaIing Institute of Knowledge

..,

Dl\ TED:

,0 ~(J

10

Pike Herndon Stosich & Johnston
By:

Qh; J?=C-/

Alan Johnston
Attomey for April Fano

7. RELEASE AGREEMENT

PERSONAL GUARANTEE
The undersigned Viarma Stibal, as Maker of this personal Guarantee, of Rigby, County of
Jefferson, State ofIdaho, hereby guarantees payment to April Fano in the amount of Twelve
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($ 12,500) for partial satisfaction of the Default Judgment in the
amount of $26,588.00 dated June 12,2009 held by April Fano against Joshua Opfar in April
Fano v. Josh Opfar at aI, in the District Court of the State of Idaho, Seventh Judicial Dislrict,
BOlmeville County, Case No. CV-2008-7144. April Fano, as Payee under this Personal
Guarantee, shall not be required to exhaust her recourse or take any action against Maker before
being entitled to payment by the undersigned of all amounts guaranteed. In the event Joshua
Opfar does not pay April Fano the said $12,500.00 within 45 days form the date July 29,2010,
Payee may enforce this guarantee against the maker. If Payee is required to bring legal action,
she shall be entitled to her reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with legal action and
collection.
In the Notice of default on the part of maker is waived and the undersigned agrees to
remain bound in spite of any extensions, renewals, modifications, or compromises of any
indebtedness, liability, or obligation of he maker under the temlS of the Default Judgment.

Dated this

50 day of July, 2010.

4'-d~~

Vianna Stibal
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ARTICLES OF ORGANIZ,,'\TI0N or
RIGHT WA Y PUBLISfIING, LtC
The undersigned .\{wagers, desiring to form

a limited 1iabiJity company (the

"Company") pursuant to the laws of the Siate of Utah, certify as follows;

!.

The name of the Company is R[G HT WA Y PUBUSHTNG, LLC.
/~'-.~'\

2.

The Company's existence shall commence upon the filing dale of these Article(H8f )

The Company shail dissolve upon the earEer of (a) .December 31, 2l 09; or (b) the day:

I

I

(ik...

h __

d

~·-_':}

\lembers entitied to receive 51% of the portion of the Company's Net Profits to which ivfcmtel's
are entitkd shall sign a written agreement of dissolution; (ii) the Company is dissolved by
judicial decree or by administrative action; (iii) the Company is not the successor company in the
merger or consolidation of two or more companies; or (Iv) the Company faUsto !lave at least one

member.
3.

The purposes Cl)f \vhich the Company is organized to engage m anv lawfu!

business activities for I,.vhich limited liabi lity companies may be organilc<l pursuant to the Act
4.

The Company's designated office and its principal place of business are at 1103 S.

Waterside Dr., SHatoga Springs, UT S4(}45.
5.

The Company's registered omCe is loc3Iea at 1103 S. \Vatel'sicie: Dr., Saratoga

Springs, VT 84045. The Company's registered agent for service of process a1 that street address

is APRIL FANO,
6.

The Company shall be manager-managed, and the m,wagement of the Company

is hereby vested in its managers. Tne names and addresses of the

m~magers

are: APRIL Ff\NO

and LINDSEY STOCK all at 1103 S. Waterside Dr., Saratoga Springs, UT &4045.

:>
:3

..,";;::

p.

u ;c:
ru c:
i£

7.

Any contract of the Compa.ny or any deed, bill of sale. Jnor1gage, lease, contract if

sale or other commitment of the Company purporting to bind the Company in any way or to

(7
~

i'"

"'I
-.t
C>

6

0

:3

0'

?!
,A

r,::

\."':1
f,h

v-'

0'
'0

conveyor encumber the interest of the Company in all or in any portion of any real or personal
property at any time held in its name, shall be signed by any Manager on bella! f of the Company,
and no other signature wiflbe required.

1

0

::::
r.:>

""

IQ

0

-<;.

0

)

g

Th.e Compmy shall be governed by a wntietl opcratJng agreement, the trons of

wn lell shall supplement the pro'VlSlons of Utah lmv

As penmt:red by sectIOn 4s..2c-003 of t1w

Utah RCVlsed LJ.D11tOO Lfl'lbilfty Company Act. and 113 proVtded III !ho Company

g

openrtmg

agreement, the membets of!:f!e Company have pennanently and una.'1!.tl1ou51y waIVed and

elunlf'.ated, to !he mlIJUmum extent [JCmtltted by law aery \lability ohny member for the return
of money or property to the Company which the member rightfully received as a dl5tnbuhon of

part Of all of the members capnai account.

We; ct::ruij that we are. the Managers of the Company fimned hereby and that we an:

autIronzed fo cxecute these Artlcles of Orgaruzatu:m

We each certIfY that to the

blowledge and behefthe fnctJt s:mted 10 Uu!> ce:rllficafc are

AcceptmIce of Registered Agent

~~~{")

2

lNe

bt-~

of our
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FANO INC

801-766-11 58

p.J

Estimate

S unrise Press LLC

)

10520 Soutb 700 East
Sandy, DT 84070

I

Name I Address

Date

Estimate #

7/2 1/2010

142&

Ship To

I

April Fane
1-801 -643-2039
. aprilfano@msn.com

P.O. Number

Project

Terms

I

Due on receipt
Qly

(

J
BI escription

___

. Total - ·

·Rate .._.. '.

500 Books 504 pages 6 x 9 on 50~ bright white black ink with full color
cover 4jO on 14 point high gloss cover and perfect bou nd with 3
knife trim
I
1,000 Booles 504- p ages (i x 9 on Sd# bright white black ink with fuj I color
cover 4/0 on 14 point hi gh gloss coyer and perfect bound with 3
I
knife trim

9.56

8.04

8.040.00T

April Fano
1-&0 i -643-2039

ACTi Iangm i s inform
6.85%

Thank you for the opportu nity to q uote this project

I
Signature

873 . 17
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FANO INC

801-766-11 58

p.2

Invoice

j unrisc Press LLC
10520 South 700 East
Sandy, UT 84070

Date

Invoice #-

7/2[/2010

20631

Bil/To
Rightway Publishing
1]03 Waterside Dr.
S~~aloga Sp rings, LIT 84045

P.O. No"

Terms

Due Date

Due on receipt

7/21/2010

.1,
VIM
Quantity
Descnpbon
Rate
Amount
\ ~-----------+----------------~--------------~--------~-----------r----------~
500 Books 504 pages 6 :x. 9 on 50# bJigh,t white black ink I'ith fun color
cover 4/0 on 14 point itigh gloss cover and perfect bound ...."ith J
knife trim

9.56

4,780.00T

I

j

I

April Fano

i '- (E)

Ll
()JJJ
'. J
i
\

Thank you for the opportu:1ity 10 quo te this proj eci

Subtotal
$4, 780.00
The unders igned n<presents tha t shC:/hc is an nuthorized agcntiof the above :lamed CUSTOMER. The
customer agrees lCl t ·10 foll owing conditions: Customer rep;cscnts lha! they have the legal rigbt 10 print,
$)2 7 .4)
p ublis h or d IS!rI :JltlC [h e materIal lor will en m e oruer IS gtv"n and Will h'.iTcI S-UNRlSEPRESSl,armlcs~ lor
Sales Tax (6.85%)
any IOS5 s ~ffcred through such prin ting. Payment or baJance is due upon complelelion of work. unlcss
f-------------------~
p ri o:- ::lITUngt:'mCnts hU"e been rr.ac.le. (n lh" c"em of d<:fau h. the CUSTOMER agrees to pay <1::ty and all
~ 5, 107.4J
:cos t, "rcolkclion. which may resu lt in 100% fees assessed. ihcluding all attorney's fees. All
Total
accounl,!im-oices over thirty (30) daY5, \';lLL BE charged nNANCE ch arges of! .5% per month .
C us tomer also a grcC$:o pay a S2S.0{) returned cht:ck fee un a~y and all returned checks.
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PaymentsfCredits
DATE

Bafance Due

so.oo
.55.1 0 7.4]

